Mapping contemporary forms of autocracy by Møller, Jørgen & Skaaning, Svend-Erik
www.ssoar.info
Mapping contemporary forms of autocracy
Møller, Jørgen; Skaaning, Svend-Erik
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung e.V. an der TU Dresden
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Møller, J., & Skaaning, S.-E. (2009). Mapping contemporary forms of autocracy. Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 6(2),
253-270. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-311606
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Mapping Contemporary Forms of Autocracy
Jørgen Møller/Svend - Erik Skaaning
Totalitarismus und Demokratie, 6 (2009), 253–270, ISSN 1612–9008
© Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH und Co. KG, Göttingen 2009
Jørgen Møller, born in 1979. MSc in
political science from Aarhus
University (2004). PhD in Political
Science from the European Univer sity
Institute in Florence, Italy (2007).
Assistant professor at the Department
of Political Science at Aarhus
University since 2008. His research
interests include conceptualization of
democracy, post - communist political
change, patterns of state formation
and qualitative methodology.
Svend - Erik Skaaning, born in 1978.
MSc (2003) and PhD (2007) in politi-
cal science from Aarhus University,
Denmark. Visiting scholar at Stanford
University (2006) and at University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill (2009).
Assistant professor at the Department
of Political Science at Aarhus
University since 2006. His research
interests include conceptualization of
regime types, regime change, patterns
of state formation and comparative
methodology.
Abstract
In  den ver gan ge nen Jahr zehn ten  sind durch dach te
neu e Typo lo gi en  der Demo kra tie  wie Pil ze  aus  dem
Boden geschos sen.  Zur glei chen  Zeit wur den  die
nicht de mo kra ti schen Sys te me  als  eine Res te ka te go rie
behan delt,  die  wenig Auf merk sam keit ver dient.  Wir
behaup ten,  dass die se Ver nach läs si gung über ra schend
und unglück lich  ist.  Die glei chen  Grün de  für  eine
Aus dif fe ren zie rung  der Typo lo gi en  der Demo kra tie
gel ten  auch  für  die Auto kra ti en.  Die Unter schei dun -
gen zwi schen ver schie de nen  Arten  der Auto kra tie soll -
ten  dabei  durch  eine Aus wei tung  des Merk mals raums
der vor han de nen Typo lo gie  der Demo kra tie geschaf -
fen wer den.  Wir nut zen  den Trans for ma ti ons in dex
von Ber tels mann,  um ver schie de ne  Typen  der Auto -
kra tie  auf  der Grund la ge  der her kömm li chen Defin i -
tions merk ma le  von Demo kra tie  zu unter schei den.
Wei ter hin wei ten  wir  das Blick feld  aus  auf  die Cha rak -
ter zü ge  des Herr schers.  Das  Ziel bei der Bestre bun gen
ist  es,  die Vor ar beit  zu leis ten,  um Unter schei dun gen
zwi schen ver schie de nen For men  der Auto kra tie  als
expla nans oder  als expla nan dum zu behan deln.
I. Introduction
More than a decade ago, Collier and Levitsky set out to appraise the flourishing
tendency to create a set of diminished subtypes in the study of democracy.1 They
stopped counting at 500 ! Since then, attempts to make systematic distinctions
between different kinds of democracies have proliferated further and the litera-
ture now teems with elaborate typologies.2
1 Cf. David Collier / Steven Levitsky, Democracy with Adjectives : Conceptual Innovation
in Comparative Research. In : World Politics, 49 (1997), pp. 430–451.
2 E. g., Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. In. Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997),
pp. 22–43; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy, Baltimore 1999; Wolfgang
Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies. In : Democratization, 11 (2004), pp.
33–58; Mikael Wigell, Mapping ‘Hybrid’ Regimes : Regime Types and Concepts in
Comparative Politics. In : Democratization, 15 (2008), pp. 230–250; Jørgen Møller /
Svend - Erik Skaaning, Beyond the Radial Delusion : Conceptualizing and Measuring
Democracy and Non - Democracy, Manuscript, Aarhus 2009. 
3 Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [1951], Ohio 1958; Carl J.
Friedrich / Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, New York
1965; Guillermo O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic - Authoritarianism :
Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley 1973; Samuel P. Huntington, Political
Order in Changing Societies, New Haven 1968; Samuel E. Finer, The Man on
Horseback : The Role of the Military in Politics, New York 1962; Juan Linz,
Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes [1975], Boulder 2000. 
4 Cf. Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation. In : Journal of Democracy, 2 (2002),
pp. 36–50; Andreas Schedler ( ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism : The Dynamics of
Unfree Competition, Boulder 2006; Steven Levitsky / Lucan A. Way, The Rise of
Competitive Authoritarianism. In : Journal of Democracy, 2 (2002), pp. 51–65.
5 Underscored, e.g., by Guillermo O’Donnell ( The Perpetual Crisis of Democracy. In :
Journal of Democracy, 7 (2007), pp. 5–11, here 8; cf. Linz, Totalitarian, pp. 35–36)
who has remarked that, “This set of countries can be distinguished in turn, albeit in
some cases somewhat hazily, from a third set wherein elections, even if held, are not
reasonably fair and many political freedoms are seriously curtailed. These are democ-
racies pour la galerie, especially the international galerie. They are the ‘electoral
authoritarianisms’ that have recently been drawing much attention in the scholarly lit-
erature”.
6 Cf. Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm. In : Journal of Democracy,
2 (2002), pp. 5–21.
7 Also, as argued by Axel Hadenius / Jan Teorell ( Authoritarian Regimes : Stability,
Change, and Pathways to Democracy, 1972–2003, Kellogg Institute for International
Studies Working Paper 331, University of Notre Dame 2006),) these conceptualizations
are only based on the attribute of ‘competitiveness’, which means that they disregard
the non - electoral attributes of autocracy which we will highlight in this paper. Speaking
the technical language of property spaces, they make for classificatory orderings on one
dimension only rather than typological orderings on a compound of attributes.
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What is so striking about this relatively new research agenda is the extent to
which it treats the non - democracies as a residual category that merits little or no
attention. When looking back at the literature of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s,
this development stands out as strong relief. In those decades, the autocratic
part of the spectrum was where important political variation was sought. Recall
– just to mention a few – the classical works of Arendt and Friedrich and Brze -
zinski on totalitarian regimes, O’Donnell on bureaucratic - authoritarianism,
Huntington on political disorder in developing countries, Finer on military dicta-
torships, and Linz’s famous effort to provide a conceptual separation between
totalitarianism and authoritarianism and their respective subtypes.3
Very recently, a number of scholars, in particular Schedler, Way and Levitsky
have advocated that the literature should change its focus and zoom in on vari-
ous types of authoritarianism rather than various types of democracy.4 There is
no doubt that this conceptual agenda has been influential of late.5 But what
these scholars basically advocate is to construe the countries situated in what has
been termed the ‘grey zone’ between democracy and autocracy6 – or at least
some of them – as diminished subtypes of authoritarianism, rather than dimin-
ished subtypes of democracy.7 What is new here is thus only the nomenclature,
8 We use the general designation ‘autocracy’ to denote the overarching category in
which regime types such as totalitarianism and authoritarianism are situated. This is in
accordance with Giovanni Sartori ( The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatham
1987, p. 205) who argues that autocracy “stands as an undisputed and hardly dis-
putable good opposite of democracy”.
9 Cf. E. g., Juan Linz / Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolida -
tion : Southern Europe, South America, and Post - Communist Europe, Baltimore
(1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave : Democratization in the Late Twen -
tieth Century, Norman 1991; Barbara Geddes, What Do We Know about Democra -
tization after Twenty Years? In : Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), pp.
115–144; Hadenius / Teorell, Authoritarian Regimes.
10 Cf. Peter Mair, Democracies. In : Daniele Caramani ( ed.), Comparative Politics,
Oxford 2008, pp. 108–132.
11 Such is the case, at least, when using a ‘thin’ definition of democracy that only empha-
sizes free elections. The referents thereby classified as democracies obviously all share
the presence of this attribute; otherwise they would simply not be democracies.
However, they have very diverse values on accompanying attributes such as civil liber-
ties ( freedom of speech, association, and assembly ) and the rule of law ( horizontal
accountability and equality before the law ); hence the heterogeneity. When embracing
‘thicker’ definitions, in which all the mentioned properties are construed as defining
attributes, membership of the consequent class of liberal democracy once again
becomes quite homogenous, and largely confined to the Western world. But this
attempt to solve the problem of empirical variation by definitional fiat simply means
that the class of democracy borders a heavily populated zone of diminished subtypes.
These were the constructs identified by Collier and Levitsky a decade ago and it is
these that have recently been systematized into typologies of democracies.
12 Cf. Peter Evans / Dietrich Rueschemeyer / Theda Skocpol ( eds.), Bringing the State Back
In, Cambridge 1985; James G. March / Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The
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as the autocracies8 proper still lie beyond the scholarly agenda. When they are in
fact treated explicitly, it is mostly to appraise the consequences of the prior
regime form for democratization9 and not to assess their causes and conse-
quences as autocracies.
In our view, this is both surprising and unfortunate. To understand why, we
need to say a bit more about the empirical and theoretical impulses behind the
new focus on different kinds of democracies. Peter Mair has pointed to two such
impulses, both of which we find convincing.10 First, the so - called third wave of
democratization means what used to be a relatively homogenous class, subsum-
ing empirical referents situated in Western Europe and North America, has
become a heterogeneous one. It now contains a large number of quite dissimilar
countries encountered in virtually every corner of the globe11 – thus it is crying
out for conceptual differentiation.
Second, Mair argues that developments within political science have also con-
tributed to the focus on subtypes of democracy. Since the early 1980s, much of
the work within the discipline and particularly within the subfield of democrati-
zation studies, has shifted to a lower level of abstraction. The plea for a return of
the state and the advent of the new institutionalisms are examples of this – in
particular vis - à - vis the prior systems theory of Gabriel Almond and associates.12
Organizational Basis of Politics, New York 1989; Gabriel Almond / G. Bingham
Powell, Comparative Politics : A Developmental Approach, Boston 1966.
13 Cf. Peter Mair, Comparative Politics : An Overview. In : Robert E. Gooding / Hans -
Dieter Klingemann ( eds.), A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford (1996), pp.
309–335.
14 Larry Diamond, Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. In : Journal of Democracy, 13
(2002), pp. 21–35, here 25.
15 Cf. Larry Diamond / Leonardo Morlino ( eds.), Assessing the Quality of Democracy,
Baltimore 2005; Guillermo O’Donnell / Jorge V. Cullell / Osvaldo M. Iazzetta ( eds.),
The Quality of Democracy : Theory and Applications, Notre Dame 2004.
16 Cf. also Giovanni Sartori ( Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. In : American
Political Science Review, 64 (1970), pp. 1033–1053, here 1042) who emphasizes that
even at the most abstract level there must be a contrary to a concept, in casu democ-
racy. This point can also be appreciated via the ‘double - root strategy’ suggested by
Matthijs Bogaard ( How to Classify Hybrid Regimes : Defective Democracy and
Electoral Authoritarianism. In : Democratization, 16 (2009), pp. 399–423).
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As Mair has explained in an earlier paper, the consequences of this shift in the
level of abstraction – and, ipso facto, in the scope of comparisons – is that insti-
tutional variation is increasingly conceived as explanans rather than explanan-
dum.13
More particularly, the aim of the contemporary typological mappings of
democracy is two - fold. The first objective is to lay bare the dividing lines within
the grey zone between liberal democracy and autocracy; a zone which – as a con-
sequence of the “unprecedented growth in the number of regimes that are nei-
ther clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian”14 – covers such a large
part of the non - Western world today. The second objective is to understand the
political, economic, and social effects of these different types of democracy. This
debate takes place, in particular, under the rubric of the ‘Quality of Democracy’-
headline.15 Whereas the former exercise is purely descriptive, the latter exercise
is basically explanatory and, sometimes, normative.
In our opinion, and to return to the subject matter, both of the two objectives
of the new and fine - grained typologies of democracy described above entail that
the non - democratic part of the spectrum is interesting as well. First, the very
existence of a grey zone between democracy proper and autocracy proper means
that the borderline between democracies ( including diminished subtypes in the
grey zone ) and non - democracies needs to clearly specified. To say this slightly
differently, it is necessary to establish the conceptual and empirical boundaries
of the overarching category of autocracy with the overarching category of
democracy functioning as an explicit frame of reference.16 Second, if it is worth-
while treating the various types of democracy as explanans and explanandum,
scrutinizing their political, economic, and social effects, then it seems equally
plausible that it is worthwhile treating the various types of autocracy as
explanans and explanandum.
In this article, we provide the descriptive footwork needed for both of these
exercises. Hence, we set out to create a typology of modern forms of autocracy.
17 We use the kind of typology that Kenneth D. Bailey ( Monothetic and Polythetic
Typologies and Their Relation to Conceptualization, Measurement, and Scaling. In :
American Sociological Review, 38 (1973), pp. 18–32, here 27) terms ‘Classification,
then Identification’, meaning that we first create our conceptual typology and then
order the empirical referents within it.
18 Cf. Møller / Skaaning, Beyond.
19 Cf. Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies, pp. 36–38.
20 Cf. David Collier / James E. Mahon, Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited : Adapting Cate -
gories in Comparative Research. In : American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), pp.
845–855; Sartori, Concept Misformation.
Møller/Skaaning, Mapping Contemporary Forms of Autocracy 257
We proceed in three steps. First, we use the present conceptualizations of
democracy to create a conceptual typology of autocracy. This is an exercise
which also allows us to write into the existing literature on non - democracies.
Secondly, we order the autocratic countries in this typology and discuss the char-
acteristics and memberships of the various types. Finally, we carry out a qualita-
tive elaboration in the context of which we direct attention to an additional,
accompanying attribute of autocracy.17
II. A Typology of Contemporary Forms of Autocracy
1. Autocracy as the mirror image of democracy
In an earlier paper, we have constructed a systematic typology of democracy.18
This typological exercise was inspired by the work of Wolfgang Merkel.19 Instead
of using Merkel’s radial logic of diminished subtypes however, we employed the
hierarchical logic of the ladder of abstraction.20 In doing so, we conceptualized
four different types of democracy : liberal democracy, polyarchy, electoral democ-
racy, and minimalist democracy.
Generally speaking, this ordering was based on three attributes, viz. electoral
rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. The thickest type – liberal democracy –
made up a bounded whole of ‘perfect scores’ on all of these attributes, situated
at the lowest level of generality. Each step onto a higher rung of the ladder of
abstraction was then performed by eliminating criteria. To elaborate, all liberal
democracies, placed at the bottom of the ladder, also fulfill the respective criteria
of polyarchy, electoral democracy, and minimalist democracy; all polyarchies
also fulfill the respective criteria of electoral democracy and minimalist democ-
racy; and all electoral democracies fulfill the criteria of minimalist democracy.
What we argue in this article is that the same three attributes of electoral
rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law provide a pivot for creating a typology of
modern forms of autocracy. To say this slightly different, we posit that it makes
sense to construe autocracy as the mirror image – or ‘contrary’ to use Sartori’s
21 Cf. Sartori, Theory of Democracy 
22 Cf. Robert Adcock / David Collier, Measurement Validity : A Shared Standard for
Qualitative and Quantitative Research. In : American Political Science Review, 95
(2001), pp. 529–546. We therefore place the concept of autocracy within the ’realistic’
tradition of Joseph A. Schumpeter ( Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York
1950) and Robert A. Dahl ( Polyarchy, New Haven 1971). They of course sought to
define democracy, but our argument is that the same notion of the regime form as a
political method can be used with respect to autocracy.
23 Cf. David Collier / Robert Adcock, Democracy and Dichotomies : A Pragmatist
Approach to the Choices about Concepts. In : Annual Review of Political Science, 2
(1999), pp. 537–565. This is also why the hierarchical notion of the ladder of abstrac-
tion is an apt tool.
24 Cf. Merkel, Embedded and Defective Democracies, pp. 36–38.
25 Cf. as argued Merkel, ibidem.
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term21 – of democracy. Ipso facto, regarding the background concept, we define
autocracy as a political regime form.22
2. Scope conditions of the typology of modern forms of autocracy
Before we present our typology, it is necessary to establish two general lines of
demarcation, namely the borderline between democracy and non - democracy
and the borderline between non - democratic ‘failed states’ and autocracy. Our
prior ordering of democracies, described above, rests on a general electoral
premise as being only countries that exhibit the presence of relatively free elec-
tions. Such systems were included in what may be termed the “overarching cate-
gory of democracy”. This is thus the one necessary and sufficient condition for
the noun, “democracy”. This separate conceptual treatment of the electoral
rights attribute is justified by a simple theoretical point which we also derive
from the literature : free elections are the condiciones sine quibus non of democ-
racy, implying that there is a certain degree of inherent conceptual hierarchy
among the attributes of democracy.23 As Merkel emphasizes, free elections are –
in a nutshell – the clearest expression of the very core of democracy, viz., the
sovereignty of the people.24 Consequently, it provides the basic criterion for dis-
tinguishing democracies from autocracies.
By extension, the one necessary and sufficient condition for membership in the
overarching category of non - democracy is the absence of free elections. We
emphasize the adjective ‘free’. The mere presence of elections does not rule out
non - democracy ( nor its autocracy - subset, cf. below ). Only free elections do that.
It should also be noted that, on the most general level, the consequence of this
scope condition is that even the extreme defectiveness of attributes such as civil
liberties and the rule of law do not make for autocracy25 insofar as the elections
are deemed free. Conceptually, this is a very important point because it makes for
parsimony. Empirically, it is almost irrelevant as no single country in our dataset,
26 Hadenius / Teorell, Authoritarian Regimes, p. 5.
27 Cf. Linz / Stepan, Problems, ch. 2.
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presented below, is characterized by such extreme defectiveness with regard to
the liberal elements whilst completely safeguarding the electoral element.
This electoral criterion is the first of our two scope conditions and we stress
the importance of defining it in such unequivocal terms. To illustrate the prob-
lems of not doing so, an otherwise interesting recent attempt to conceptualize
different forms of authoritarianism can be highlighted. Hadenius and Teorell
introduce a general threshold between democracy and the ‘authoritarian family’
based on an index made up of the Freedom in the World- scores of the Freedom
House ( FH ) and the Polity - scores. Using the mean of the FH and Polity scales
(converted to the range of 0–10), they draw the line at 7.5. This threshold is
based on “the mean cutoff point separating democracy from autocracy in five
well - known categorical measures of democracy”.26
Regarding the general count of autocracies, this line of demarcation comes
relatively close to that proposed in this paper. We find it very problematic how-
ever, that no explicit account is given as to what it means with respect to the elec-
toral attribute – and with respect to other attributes included in, e.g., the FH -
subcategory of Civil Liberties. More particularly, no justification is given as to
why non - electoral criteria are needed to establish the dividing line between
democracies and non - democracies. Moreover, we do not even know if the coun-
tries unable to clear this threshold, which is based on the average value across
several attributes, are in fact characterized by the absence of free elections.
Turning to the second scope condition, it is meant to delimit the subset of
non- democracies that can be called autocracies without committing conceptual
stretching. The point here is that a particular aspect of the general attribute
often termed stateness27 is a necessary condition for autocracy. In gist, we argue
that autocracy requires the presence of state – or at least a power apparatus –
that has a monopoly on the use of force. This qualifier is necessary to distinguish
between what might be termed anarchic non - democracies, often in the guise of
non - democratic ‘failed states’, and autocracies proper.
Within these limits, we make the following distinctions with regard to the
three attributes of electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Regarding
the electoral scope condition, we simply operate with one status, viz., the
absence of free elections. This is justified by such absence of free elections being
the defining attribute of non - democracy. This is our first scope condition of the
typology of modern forms of autocracy. As regards the two other attributes, we
distinguish between the respective values of moderate or severe defects on the
one hand and extreme defects on the other hand.
These values, which we further explain below, imply the presence of an addi-
tional, or residual, class without defects, meaning that we implicitly trichotomize
each of these two attributes. This would logically make for a typology of eight
(23) types, but we use a combination of the two types of reduction which Elman
28 Cf. Colin Elman, Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies in International
Politics. In : International Organization, 59 (2005), pp. 293–326.
29 Cf. Diamond, Developing Democracy, pp. 33–58.
30 The only possible exceptions here are small European principalities such as Monaco,
San Marino and Liechtenstein, none of which are included in our dataset. But even
these do not exhibit a mix of low electoral and high ‘liberal’ scores when pinning one’s
faith in the Freedom House’s Freedom of the World Survey for 2007. Instead, they
score low ( i.e., ‘well’ ) on both ‘Political Rights’ and ‘Civil Liberties’. Still, we do not
rule out that these might be classified as some kind of liberal autocracies if they had
been included in the BTI.
31 We thereby appreciate a point made by Alexander George / Andrew Bennett ( Case
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Mass. 2005, p.
249). Regarding typological reductions, they stress that it is only types that are not
‘socially possible’ that should be removed. What they mean is that only the types that
are neither found empirically nor to be expected theoretically can be deleted – rather
than deleting all null cellsautomatically. 
32 Once again, the property space that we illustrate figuratively has thus been implicitly
reduced. More particularly, on the electoral scope condition we have collapsed two
continuous cells of severe and extreme defects.
33 Sartori, Theory of Democracy, pp. 198, 200.
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terms ‘logical compression’ and ‘empirical compression’ to reduce the property
space.28 The justification for the former strategy is that no country is expected to
show any defect on the twin attributes of civil liberties and rule of law insofar as
it is characterized by the absence of free elections. A number of scholars have
observed that29 although such ‘liberal autocracies’ may have existed in 19th cen-
tury Europe, today they are an extinct species.30 The latter strategy then works
as a robustness - test. The actual empirical ordering carried out below shows that
such theoretically unexpected combinations do not occur on the ground.31
Consequently, our conceptual typology consists of four (22) types ( see table 2
below ). The two polar types make up the bounded wholes of totalitarianism and
authoritarianism. The former is defined as the combination of extreme defects
on all three attributes. In the case of totalitarianism, our electoral criterion is
thus stricter than the general condition of non - democracy ( as indicated in table
1). In gist, the electoral attribute must be characterized by extreme defects to
make for membership of this type, whereas severe defects are enough in all other
types.32 This is in accordance with Sartori who has argued that, “Totalitarianism
is an ultimate escalation of despotism, the strongest of all despotisms ... totalitar-
ianism simply consists of all the characteristics of oppressive regimes at their
highest point of conceivable perfection.”33
The authoritarian type is defined by the combination of moderate or severe
defects on the two attributes of civil liberties and the rule of law, given the
absence of free elections. The remaining two types are mixed. They combine the
status of extreme defects on one attribute ( e. g. civil liberties ), with the status of
severe or moderate defects on the other attribute ( e. g, the rule of law ).
The next analytical step is to order present - day autocracies in this typology.
Before doing so however, it would be appropriate to re - examine the existing lit-
34 Cf. Linz, Totalitarian; Linz / Stepan, Problems; Wolfgang Merkel, Systemtransforma -
tion, Opladen 1999; Wolfgang Merkel / Aurel Crossaint, Formale und informale
Institu tionen in defekten Demokratien. In : Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 41 (2000),
pp. 3–31. 
35 The scores cover the year 2007.
36 Cf. Gerardo Munck / Jay Verkuilen, Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy.
Evaluating Alternative Indices. In : Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), pp. 5–34.
Møller/Skaaning, Mapping Contemporary Forms of Autocracy 261
erature on non - democratic regimes and show the extent to which our conceptu-
alizations of totalitarianism and authoritarianism fit into this body of writing.
3. Relating the typology to previous conceptualizations of autocratic regimes
Our two pure types conform rather well to the established writings on authori-
tarian and totalitarian regimes. In table 1 below, we relate the preceding concep-
tualization to that of Linz and Merkel.34
Linz actually operates with four dimensions : leadership, mobilization, ideol-
ogy, and pluralism. Merkel goes even further and posits no less than six dimen-
sions : legitimization of political power, access to political power, monopoly on
political power, structure of political power, claim to political power, and exer-
cise of political power. However, according to our reading, both of them clearly
distinguish between our three defining attributes, and as the overview shows,
their definitions on these are quite close to our definitions.
Besides electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law, both Linz and
Merkel touch upon some extra traits. One of them, which is solely associated
with totalitarianism, seems relevant for our purposes. What Linz and Merkel
argue is that such extreme autocracies are supported by an explicit ideology,
offering an aegis against regime breakdown. We discuss the extent to which our
cases of totalitarianism conform to this criterion in the context of the presented
typology.
III. Ordering the Referents in the Typology
To order the referents in the typology, we turn to the Bertelsmann Transfor -
mation Index ( BTI ) 2008.35 Invoking the criteria of Munck and Verkuilen,36 the
BTI arguably has a competitive edge vis - à - vis indices such as Freedom House’s
Freedom of the World and Polity. This relatively new dataset covers 125 develop-
ing countries ( and those in transformation ) with more than two million inhabi-
tants. Most of the countries excluded from the dataset are therefore “developed
democracies” or small island democracies. In other words, the dataset allows us
to capture most of the existing non - democracies.
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Political Participation Rule of Law
A. Free elections E. Separation of powers
B. Democrats rule F. Independent judiciary
C. Association/assembly rights G. Civil rights
D. Freedom of expression
Table 2 : Subcategories of Political Participation and Rule of Law
37 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market : Political and Economic Reforms in
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge 1991, p. 13.
38 We exclude the rule of law - subcomponent of abuse of office from consideration since
it is not relevant when distinguishing between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.
39 To the extent that scores from more than one subcategory are used to capture an
attribute, we consider them to be mutually constitutive corresponding to the logic of
bounded wholes. Consequently, rather than using the average, we employ a minimum
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One of the great advantages of the BTI - scores is that they are linked directly
to narrative qualifiers. We have already built these qualifiers into our definitions
as they denote the values of ‘no defects ( nd )’, ‘moderate defects ( md )’, ‘severe
defects ( sd )’, and ‘extreme defects ( ed )’ on each of the subcategories. Repeating
the verbal definitions of these categories across the subcategories covering elec-
toral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law would require too much space.
Instead, we have included them as appendix 1. They are basically self - explana-
tory and show why we have chosen the specific points of demarcation on the
three attributes. One general elaboration is however, worth spelling out. As the
BTI linguistic qualifiers show, our decision to label all countries exhibiting
severe or extreme defects on the electoral attribute as non - democracies, con-
forms well with Przeworski’s famous definition of democracy as “a system of
ruled open - endedness, or organized insecurity”.37 The point is that no such inse-
curity is present when the countries exhibit severe or extreme defects, cf. the for-
mulation in appendix 1, whereas some such open - endedness is present in the
case of moderate electoral defects.
More particularly, among the five categories of political transformation
assessed in the BTI, only the questions linked to two of them, viz., political par-
ticipation and rule of law,38 are directly relevant for our typology. These compo-
nents are illustrated in table 2, in which we also report the letters which we use
to denote them below.
The distinguishing components between different kinds of autocracies are the
civil liberties of association / assembly rights ( C ) and freedom of expression ( D )
and the rule of law criteria of separation of powers ( E ), independence of the
judiciary ( F ), and respect for civil rights ( G ).39 A few other components are used
Rule of law (ed) Rule of law (md or sd)
Civil liberties (ed) 5 Totalitarian 5 Mixed type
Civil liberties (md or sd) 0 Mixed type 33 Authoritarian
A total of 58 countries are classified as non - democracies on the basis of the
general electoral scope - condition. Of these, 1540 fall short on the second scope
condition of stateness. The remaining 43 countries are situated in the overarch-
ing class of autocracy and are therefore ordered in the typology. The numbers in
table 3 indicate how many referents fall in each type.
In the bounded whole of totalitarian regimes, when combining the status of
extreme defects in civil liberties and the rule of law, we find only five countries,
viz., China, Eritrea, Laos, North Korea, and Syria. Tellingly, all of these coun-
tries also show extreme defects on the electoral attribute. This was the additional
defining attribute of totalitarianism which we introduced in the conceptual part.
This indicates a systemic logic, or possibly even a lock - in, of extremeness.
Another five countries, namely Cuba, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, and
Vietnam, are situated in the adjacent mixed type which is defined by extreme
civil liberty defects but only moderate or severe defects on the rule of law. The
remaining thirty - three countries ( viz., Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bah rain, Belarus, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Malay -
sia, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Singapore,
Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Zim -
babwe ) are situated in the opposite polar type. These are the pure authoritarian
score procedure to aggregate them, as Gary Goertz has recommended ( Social Science
Concepts : A User’s Guide, Princeton 2006). Note that because we focus on autocratic
regimes, totalitarian regime – rather than liberal democracy – constitutes the funda-
mental polar type.
40 Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and
Yemen.
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to operationalize our two scope conditions. The free elections components ( A )
and democrats rule ( B ) are used to distinguish democracies ( exhibiting moder-
ate or no defects on the electoral attribute ) from non - democracies ( exhibiting
severe or extreme defects on the electoral attribute ). Moreover, the stateness
subcategory of the monopoly on the use of force ( not shown in table 2) is
employed to exclude failed states without centralized authority ( exhibiting a sta-
tus of severe or extreme defects ) from the set of non - democracies. The following
empirical ordering can be constructed on this basis.
Table 3 : A Typology of Modern Forms of Autocracy
41 Even though only the electoral attribute is defining for autocracy on the highest level of
abstraction, all three attributes are defining for the four more particular types created
by descending the ladder of abstraction according to the hierarchic logic of Sartori.
42 Cf. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York 1992; Le -
vitsky/ Way, The Rise, p. 61.
43 Cf. Linz / Stepan, Problems. Cf. also Giovanni Sartori ( Totalitarianism, Model Mania
and Learning from Error. In : Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (1993), pp. 5–22) who
argues that the pure type of totalitarianism is absent from the contemporary world.
The use of the prefix ‘post’ is somewhat misleading. For example, Syria and Eritrea
have never had guiding ideologies akin to the ‘political religions’ of fascism and com-
munism. Cf. Hans Maier ( ed.), Political Religions : Concepts for the Comparison of
Dictator ships, Oxon 2004.
44 Sartori, Theory of Democracy.
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regimes negatively defined by the absence of any extreme defects. However, in
anticipating the subsequent qualitative robustness test, two countries need to be
removed from this set. These are Papua New Guinea and Liberia, both of which
seem to have been assigned scores that are too low on the electoral attribute in
the BTI, cf. below.
Based on this simple overview, some interesting conclusions can be made
about the way autocracies score on the different defining41 attributes. First, the
clear majority of the autocracies are of a more moderate kind, as they do not
exhibit extreme defects in civil liberties or the rule of law. This somewhat prag-
matic regime form, which we term authoritarianism, is thus the species of non -
democracy most prevalent in the world of today.
Second, only five countries can meaningfully be labelled as totalitarian, which
goes to show that this regime form is running dry in the world of today. This con-
clusion can be further substantiated by briefly touching up on Linz’s and Merkel’s
point about genuine totalitarian regimes being supported by an explicit ideology.
As a number of scholars have pointed out, democracy has won the normative bat-
tle with her challengers in the preceding decades.42 Even in some of the remain-
ing communist regimes, such as China, ideology is not what it was some decades
ago; legitimacy created via economic growth is arguably more important than
that associated with utopian social and political aims. Some nuances are thus in
order. In the world of today, the question is whether it makes sense to classify
these countries as totalitarian at all. In comparison to the totalitarian regimes of
the twentieth century that are famously described by Friedrich and Brzezinski,
the present members of the class surely pale. This presents some justification for
inventing new terms which qualify the type, such as Linz’s and Stepan’s concept
of ‘post - totalitarianism’.43 Suffice to say here, however, that the five countries
mentioned come very close to totalitarian rule. This is for the simple reason that,
with regard to the three attributes of electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule
of law, they, to reuse Sartori’s formulation, consist “of all the characteristics of
oppressive regimes at their highest point of conceivable perfection”44.
Third, it turns out that there is a particular sequencing in the way the coun-
tries score on the attributes. No single country with extreme defects on the rule
45 Consisting of the classes of moderate and severe defects on the one, and extreme
defects on the other on the two attributes of civil liberties and the rule of law, as well as
the classes of severe defects on the one hand and extreme defects on the other hand on
the attribute of electoral rights.
46 Cf. Bailey, Monothetic and Polythetic, pp. 18–32.
47 Cf. Huntington, Third Wave; Geddes, What Do We Know. Hadenius / Teorell,
Authoritarian Regimes introduce a more elaborate classification on this dimension.
This allows them to include a type that they name multi - party authoritarianism which
they show to be the best point of departure for democratization. This is not surprising
as this type most likely belongs in the grey zone between democracy and non - democ-
racy, and is not classified as autocracy per se. This is also indicated by the fact that, on
average, it is much more ‘democratic’ than the other types of autocracy identified by
Hadenius and Teorell. Furthermore, as the adjective ‘multi - party’ indicates, this is par-
ticularly so with regard to the electoral attribute which we have argued should be
employed to establish the borderline between democracy and non - democracy in the
first place. We therefore maintain Geddes’ and Huntington’s distinctions. We also
include the class of ( traditional ) monarchy, which as Hadenius and Teorell argue, has
been overlooked by the former. 
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of law - attribute is thus characterized by less than extreme defects on the civil lib-
erties - attribute. In autocracies hence, the civil liberty criteria are violated to at
least the same extent, and sometimes more, than the rule of law criteria.
By unfolding and including the implicit dichotomy on the electoral attribute,
thus substructing a property space made up of eight (23) types,45 it is indeed pos-
sible to show that the empirical distribution of the 43 countries conforms to
what Bailey terms a perfect simple order scale,46 meaning that there are no tie
scores on the properties. To elaborate, any country exhibiting extreme defects
on the attribute of civil liberty necessarily obtains extreme defects on the attrib-
utes of rule of law and electoral rights. Likewise, any country exhibiting extreme
defects on the rule of law is also characterized by extreme defects on the elec-
toral attribute. We cannot further pursue this interesting issue in this paper,
which engages in a descriptive exercise only. Therefore we simply note that there
seems to be a systematic sequencing, indicating an underlying systemic logic. We
leave the question about the causes of this sequencing for future research.
IV. A Qualitative Elaboration
Having ordered the autocracies on the three defining attributes, we proceed to
qualitatively scrutinize an additional property, namely the character of the ru -
ler(s). Inspired by Huntington and Geddes,47 we here distinguish between the
four classes of personalist rule, party rule, military rule, and traditional rule (i. e.,
monarchy ).48 We do not understand this addition to be a defining attribute of
either the overarching category of autocracy or its four more particular subtypes.
Rather, we construe it as an accompanying attribute, the analytical value of which
is to bring forward some interesting characteristics of these non - democracies.
Personalist rule Party rule Military rule Traditional
monarchy 
Algeria, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Congo,
Egypt, Guinea,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Libya,
Tajikistan, Togo,
Uzbekistan
Angola, Armenia,
Cambodia,
Cameroon, CHINA,
Cuba, ERITREA,
Ethiopia, LAOS,
Malaysia, NORTH
KOREA, Rwanda,
SYRIA, Singapore,
Tunisia,
Turkmenistan,
Vietnam, Zimbabwe
Mauritania,
Thailand
Bahrain, Bhutan,
Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates
Table 4 : Ordering the Autocracies in the qualitative classification
Note : the distinctions in emphasis between bold, italic and normal indicate the type of autoc-
racy : TOTALITARIANISM, Mixed type, and Authoritarianism.
48 In a democracy, the ruler is the people through its representatives ( or directly ). On a
more particular level it is conventional to make a distinction between presidential, par-
liamentary, and semi - presidential government.
49 Cf. Huntington, Third Wave, p. 112. Another possibility, recommended by Geddes, is
to use amalgams or mixed types. We have refrained from doing so to decrease the com-
plexity of the ordering. But here we report and describe the cases that fit less neatly.
First, there are the cases of ‘personalist - party rule’ ( classified in the personalist type ) :
Algeria, Egypt, Togo, Tunesia. Second, there are the cases of ‘personalist - military rule’
( classified in the personalist type ) : Guinea. Third, the cases of ‘party - personalist rule’
(classified in the party type ) : Angola, Armenia, Cameroon, North Korea, Rwanda,
Syria, Zimbabwe.
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We have attempted to use a systematic procedure to order the countries in
this fourfold classification. One of the authors has thus read the BTI country
reports on all of the 43 autocracies and on the basis of information herein, has
assigned each country to one of the four classes. Subsequently, the other author
has repeated this procedure using Freedom House’s equivalent country reports
for the same year ( i.e., 2007) as a robustness check without knowing the results
of the first ordering. Regarding the instances in which the two orderings did not
match, the two authors revisited the cases on their own and subsequently
reached a common judgment through deliberation. Admittedly, not all empirical
cases fit neatly into these categories. In such instances we classified regimes
according to a principle of ‘dominant resemblance’.49 The results are illustrated
in table 4 below.
Only three referents did not fit into this classification : Iran, which is basically
a clerical regime, and Liberia and Papua New Guinea, which according to the
narratives in both the BTI and the FH reports are in fact minimalist democra-
cies, meaning that they have been misclassified as autocracies. This latter point
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goes to show that the qualitative elaboration has the further merit of retesting an
important aspect of the typological ordering, viz., the electoral scope condition.
The verdict on Liberia and Papua New Guinea is in fact so clear, supported by
both the BTI and the FH - reports, that it justifies eliminating these two countries
from the set of autocracies.
Otherwise, the overview on this accompanying property of autocracy is inclu-
sive. What comes out of it is in essence that all four types, including traditional
monarchies, exist in the present world but that most contemporary autocracies
are governed by parties. Also, it is interesting, though not surprising, that all
totalitarian countries belong in the class of party rule.
V. Conclusions
In this article, we have argued that the present typologies of regime forms, which
have been mushrooming under the auspices of the third wave of democratization,
suffer from a blind spot : they neglect the autocracies proper, i. e., the countries
situated beyond the so - called grey zone. If treated at all, this part of the spectrum
is transformed into a residual class. Most often it is simply ignored. This is unfor-
tunate as the very justification for creating the new typologies entails that distinc-
tions between different kinds of autocracies are also interesting.
To remedy this problem, we have constructed a systematic ordering of autoc-
racies. The very premise of this exercise is to be found in the deceivingly simple
point that autocracy should be defined as the mirror image of democracy, which
also paves the way for creating a property space that works as an addition to the
democratic property space. On this basis, we have presented a fourfold typology,
delimited by the two scope conditions of the absence of free elections and the
presence of a public monopoly on the use of force, and ordered 43 autocracies
herein. Most of these countries belong in the type that we termed authoritarian.
They are defined by only moderate or severe defects on the two attributes of civil
liberties and the rule of law. Five countries were situated in the opposite polar
type of totalitarianism, which is defined by extreme defects on both of the men-
tioned attributes as well as extreme defects on the electoral scope condition. An
additional five countries inhabited the mixed type that is characterized by
extreme defects on civil liberties and only moderate or severe defects on the rule
of law. It thus turned out that there was a systematic sequencing to the ordering.
We also considered an accompanying attribute, namely the character of the
ruler( s ), and demonstrated that all but three of our autocracies could be ordered
in a simply one - dimensional classification distinguishing between personalist
rule, party rule, military rule, and traditional monarchy. We trust that the
descriptive work presented in this article can be utilized in future research on
both the causes and consequences of autocracies. Also, we feel confident that we
Free elections
(A)
Democrats rule
(B)
Association/
Assembly rights (C)
Freedom of
expression (D)
No defect
(9–10)
No constraints
on free and fair
elections
Elected rulers
have the effective
power to govern
The freedom of
association and
assembly is unres-
tricted
There is unres-
tricted freedom of
opinion and the
press
Moderate
defect
(6–8)
General electi-
ons are held and
accepted in prin-
ciple as the
means of filling
leadership positi-
ons. However,
there are some
constraints on
the principle of
equality
Elected rulers
have the power to
govern in princi-
ple, but individual
power groups can
set their own
domains apart or
enforce special-
interest policies
against the state
There are partial
constraints - not
consistent with
democratic princi-
ples - on the free-
dom of association,
but as a rule there
are no prohibitions
on parties or social
organizations
Freedom of opi-
nion and the press
is subject to some
intervention that
undermines demo-
cratic principles,
but outright prohi-
bitions on the
press are limited
to a few isolated
cases
Severe
defect
(3–5)
Elections or par-
tial elections are
held but have de
facto only limi-
ted influence
over who rules
Elected rulers
have the power to
govern in impor-
tant matters, but
the fundamental
orientation of the
constitution can
be curtailed or
rendered inef-
fective by strong
veto groups
Opposition parties
with any relevance
for governance are
prohibited or syste-
matically disabled.
Freedom of assem-
bly is not ensured
everywhere by the
state. Civic organi-
zations can act if
they support the
regime or are not
outspokenly critical
of it
The core elements
of a public sphere
and of public
debate exist but
are vulnerable to
distortion and
manipulation
through massive
intervention
Extreme
defect
(1–2)
No democratic
elections at the
national level
Elected rulers
have de facto no
power to govern,
or rulers are not
democratically
elected
No freedom of asso-
ciation for political
and social groups.
No freedom of
assembly
No freedom of
opinion or of the
press
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have contributed to the discussion about the ways in which to distinguish
between democracy and autocracy in the first place.
Appendix
Table 5 : BTI’s Political Participation Criterion : Links between Scores and
Conditions
Separation of powers
(E)
Independent judiciary
(F)
Civil rights
(G)
No defect
(9-10)
There are no constraints
on the basic functions
involved in the separa-
tion of powers, especi-
ally on  mutual checks
and balances
The judiciary is free
both from unconstitutio-
nal intervention by
other institutions and
from corruption. There
are mechanisms for judi-
cial review of legislative
or executive acts
There are no restricti-
ons on civil rights
Moderate
defect (6-8)
The separation of
powers is restricted par-
tially and temporarily.
Fundamentally though,
a restoration of balance
is sought, especially by
the other branches
The judiciary is establis-
hed as a distinct profes-
sion and operates relati-
vely independently, but
its functions are parti-
ally restricted by factors
such as corruption and
insufficient territorial or
functional penetration
Civil rights are violated
partially or temporarily
or are not implemented
in some parts of the
country
Severe
defect (3-5)
One branch (generally
the executive) has an
ongoing and either
informally or formally
confirmed monopoly on
power, which may
include the colonization
of other powers
The judiciary is institu-
tionally differentiated,
but its decisions and
doctrine are subordina-
ted to political authori-
ties or severely res-
tricted by functional
deficits such as territo-
rial penetration, resour-
ces or severe corruption
There is a massive viola-
tion over extended
periods of tim, or they
are protected only wit-
hin limited enclaves
Extreme
defect (1-2)
The separation of
powers is either non-
existent or it exists only
on paper
The judiciary is not
institutionally differen-
tiated or is significantly
subordinated to reli-
gious or political autho-
rities
Civil rights either have
no protection (even in
principle) or they are
systematically violated
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Table 6 : BTI’s Rule of Law Criterion : Links between Scores and Conditions
